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AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (December 30, 2010)
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BUSINESS LAW 
Summary 
 An appeal from summary judgment that was granted on the theory that a Nevada LLC 
whose charter is revoked loses its capacity to sue. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 Summary judgment overturned because revocation of an LLC‟s charter does not dissolve 
its capacity to sue.  
 
Facts 
 AA Primo Builders, LLC (“Primo”), sued the Washingtons to recover money due for 
having remodeled the Washingtons‟ patio in 2005.  After two years of litigation and after Primo 
failed to file required files and pay fees, the Secretary of State revoked AA Primo‟s charter to do 
business as an LLC.  The district court found that without a charter Primo could not maintain a 
suit against the Washingtons.  Primo requested time to allow them to reinstate their charter, but 
the district court refused and granted the Washingtons‟ summary judgment motion. 
After the district court dismissed its suit, AA Primo filed a „motion to amend order‟ that 
asked to vacate the dismissal.  In the motion, AA Primo included proof that its charter had been 
restored and noted that NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.276(5) (2009) states that if an administrative 
agency reinstates a revoked charter, the reinstatement "relates back to the date on which the 
company forfeited its right to transact business . . . as if such right had at all times remained in 
full force and effect."  The district court denied their motion, and Primo filed a notice of appeal.   
Issue 1: Whether a „motion to amend order‟ tolled the time to file a motion of appeal, thus, 
granting the Nevada Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
 
Holding: Primo‟s „motion to amend order‟ tolled the time to file their motion of appeal.  "So 
long as a post-judgment motion for reconsideration is [1] in writing, [2] timely filed, [3] states its 
ground with particularity, and [4] 'request[s] a substantive alteration of the judgment, not merely 
the correction of a clerical error, or relief of a type wholly collateral to the judgment,' . . . there is 
no reason to deny it [NEV. R. CIV. P. 59(e)] status, with tolling effect under [NEV. R. APP. P. 
4(a)(4)(C)]."
2
 
 
Discussion 
Primo claimed that its „motion to amend order‟ was a NEV. R. CIV. P. 59(e) motion that 
tolled the time required to file a notice of appeal.  The Washingtons argued that Primo's „motion 
to amend order‟ did not toll the time to file a notice of appeal because it was really a „motion for 
reconsideration,‟ and under EIGHTH DIST. CT. R. 2.24(b) and Nevada case law, a motion for 
reconsideration does not toll the time required to file a notice of appeal. 
Disposing of certain listed motions, including a NEV. R. CIV. P. 59(e) motion to alter or 
amend the judgment, tolls the 30 days‟ time to file a notice of appeal.3  The Court defined a 
“motion to amend the judgment” through statutes.  Per Nev. R. Civ. P. 59(e), a motion to amend 
"[must] be filed no later than 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the judgment," 
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and per Nev. R. Civ. P. 7(b), it must be "in writing, . . . state with particularity [its] grounds [and] 
set forth the relief or order sought."  The Court stated that, “echo[ing]” its federal counterpart, 
Nev. R. Civ. P. 59(e) broadly included many types of motions, such as a motion to vacate a 
judgment, motions "correct[ing] manifest errors of law or fact,' 'newly discovered or previously 
unavailable evidence,' the need 'to prevent manifest injustice,' or a 'change in controlling law,‟" 
and that "the only real limitation on the type of motion permitted [was] that it must request a 
substantive alteration of the judgment, not merely correction of a clerical error, or relief of a type 
wholly collateral to the judgment."
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The Court then found that AA Primo's „motion to amend order‟ qualified as a Nev. R. 
Civ. P. 59(e) motion because it was in writing, it “invoked"5 Nev. R. Civ. P. 59, it "asked to 
vacate the judgment of dismissal,"
6
 and it argued that the dismissal was the result of an error of 
law. 
Next, the Court addressed the Washingtons' argument that the "motion to amend order" 
was really a motion for reconsideration. 
 
EIGHTH DIST. CT. R. 2.24(b) 
Under EIGHTH DIST. CT. R. 2.24(b), a motion for reconsideration “does not toll the 30-
day period for filing a notice of appeal.”  However, the Court found that the first sentence of 
EIGHTH DIST. CT. R. 2.24(b) excludes several motions, including Nev. R. Civ. P. 59(e), from 
EIGHTH DIST. CT. R. 2.24(b)‟s other provisions, and so EIGHTH DIST. CT. R. 2.24(b) does not 
render a proper Nev. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion non-tolling.
7
  The Court noted that the court rule 
had to be read this way so as not to be inconsistent with the Nevada Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  Otherwise, an inconsistency between the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
the Eighth District Court Rules  would arise in violation of NEV. R. CIV. P. 83 and 91(a).
8
 
 
Nevada Common Law and Motions for Reconsideration 
The Court began by acknowledging that Nevada case law had distinguished motions for 
reconsideration from motions to alter or amend, and that the former did not toll the time to file a 
notice of appeal.
9
  However, the purpose of the distinction was no longer necessary in light of 
NRAP 4(a)(6), and was no longer good law in light of Winston Products Co. v. DeBoer.
10
  The 
current NRAP 4(a)(4) dissolved the need for a distinction by loosening the requirements to make 
a timely appeal, and Winston stated that NRAP 4(a)(4) should not be used as a trap for unwary 
draftsmen.
11
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Issue 2: "Whether a Nevada limited liability company whose charter is revoked, then reinstated, 
may litigate a pending suit to conclusion."
12
 
Holding: "[Y]es, for three separate, independently sufficient reasons.  First, the right to “transact 
business” that is forfeited on charter revocation does not normally include an LLC‟s capacity to 
sue and be sued.  Second, reinstatement restores the entity‟s capacity to conduct itself as a 
limited liability company retroactively to the date of revocation; this includes the right to litigate 
pending cases to conclusion.  Finally, dismissal should not be ordered in cases of this kind 
without giving the entity a brief stay, if requested, to pursue reinstatement of its charter."
13
 
DiscussionThe Court first noted that questions of entity capacity are reviewed de novo.   
Next, the Court acknowledged that under NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.274(2), an LLC may not 
transact business while its charter is revoked.  However, the Court turned to a 9th Circuit case
14
 
that interpreted "transact business" using Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary.  The Nevada 
Supreme Court then found that the "business" that NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.274(2) referred to was 
the business the LLC was primarily engaged in.  For law firms, "business" could include suing 
and being sued, but business is not so for construction companies.  Therefore, NEV. REV. STAT. § 
86.274(2)‟s prohibition on “transact[ing] business” did not reach Primo‟s ability to sue. 
 Next, the Court affirmed its holding by reaching the same result through application of 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.274, which states that an entity whose charter was revoked could follow 
the same proceedings with respect to its assets as a dissolved entity.  Because a dissolved entity 
could sue and be sued under NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.505, an LLC with a revoked charter could 
also sue and be sued. 
 The Washingtons argued that Primo ceased to exist when it lost its charter, and so it 
could not sue or be sued.  They argued that even if Primo did not cease to exist, their right to sue 
or be sued died under application of NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.281(1), which (they asserted) 
provides that "only 'organized and existing' companies may 'sue and be sued.'"
15
  Lastly, the 
Washingtons argued that revoking the right to sue and be sued would deter future companies 
from allowing their charters to be revoked. 
 To the Washingtons' first argument, the Court replied that businesses do not really cease 
to exist when their charters are revoked.  The Court cited several statutes and cases that allowed 
dissolved or revoked entities to continue or resume activities.
16
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 For example, the Court cited NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.505 (permitting dissolved entities to wind up their affairs); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.580 (permitting permanently revoked entities to be revived); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 86.276(5) 
(permitting revoked entity‟s charter to be retroactively reinstated); Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court 812 P.2d 154, 
160 (Cal. 1991) (stating that an entity‟s dissolution is not “its death, but merely . . . its retirement.”). 
 To the Washingtons' second argument, the Court replied that the Washingtons misstated 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.281(1) by inserting the word „only.‟  NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.281(1) is really 
a list of permitted activities for Nevada LLCs. 
 To the Washingtons' third argument, the Court replied that refusing to allow a company 
with a revoked charter to sue or be sued is too harsh a punishment for not filing required 
documents or paying their fee.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 86 sets forth penalties for operating with a 
revoked charter, and the penalties are relatively light when compared to punishments for 
companies who were never chartered. 
 
 Finally, the Court added that the district court should have allowed Primo time to 
reinstate its charter because it would have avoided the unnecessary delay and expense of 
dismissal, post-judgment motion practice, and appeal. 
